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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 78A-4-103(2)(a) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-403(l). This is an appeal of a
final order in a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This case addresses whether Respondent/Appellee Department of Health's
(hereinafter "Agency") policy excluding funding of Speech Augmentative
Communication Devices (SACDs)1 for adults violates the Medicaid Act,
specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)17,42U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) and 42 C.F.R.
§§ 440.230(b). The only facts relevant to this issue are that the
Petitioners/Appellants Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin are adults, and that
SACDs are not covered devices for adults under Utah's Medicaid program. The
parties stipulated, for the purposes of addressing this issue below, that Nicholas
Conley and Patty Olguin are adults, and that the devices requested are not covered
under Utah's Medicaid program for adults. (Conley/Olguin's Prehearing
Memorandum, pp. 2,3) (r. 14,15); (Agency's Prehearing Response Memorandum,

1

SACDs, (also known as speech generating devices (SGDs or augmentative
communication devices (ACDs)) generate authentic digitized speech output. Noted
physicist Stephen Hawking uses such a device. For more information on these devices
and their capabilities including video demonstrations, see
www.dvnavoxtech.com/start/cerebral-palsv; www.prentrom.com/casestudies.
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1

pp. 2,3) (r. 51, 52) This issue is addressed throughout the parties' prehearing
memoranda.
This appeal presents only an issue of law. As such, the standard of appellate
review is for the court to review the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) statutory
interpretations for correctness. Frito-Lay v. Labor Commission, 193 P.3d 665, 669
(Utah Ct. App. 2008). Under the review of correctness standard no particular
deference is given for rulings on questions of law. Ellsworth Paulsen Const]-. Co.
v. 51-SPR-L.L.C, 183 P.3d 248,252 (Utah2008).
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS
The following Medicaid Act statutes and implementing regulations are of
central importance to the issues presented.
42 U.S.C. §1396-1:
"For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such
families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or selfcare, . . ."2
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B):

2

This provision was previously codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 until recently "editorially"
transferred to this section. Full section in Addendum.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
2 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"(a) A state plan for medical assistance must... (10) provide ... that the
medical assistance made available to any individual described in
subparagraph (A)— (i) shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than
the medical assistance made available to any other such individual, and (ii)
shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance
made available to individuals not described in subparagraph (A);3
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(D):
"(a) A state plan for medical assistance must. ..(10) provide ... (D) for the
inclusion of home health services for any individual who, under the State
plan, is entitled to nursing facility: services;"
42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(17):
"A state plan for medical assistance m u s t . . . ( a ) . . . include reasonable
standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical
assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this
subchapter,..."
42 U.S.C. 1396d(a)(7):
"For the purposes of this subchapter ...
(a)Medical assistance: The term "medical assistance" means payment of
part or all of the cost of the following care and services or the care and
services themselves, or both... (7) home health care services;"4
42 C.F.R. 440.70(b)(3):
"(b) Home health services include the following services and items. Those
listed in paragraphs (b)(1), (2) and (3) of this section are required services;
those in paragraph (b)(4) of this section are optional.
(3) Medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the
home."5
* 42 C.F.R. 440.120:
3

Full text of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) in Addendum.
Full text of 42 U.S.C. § 1396d in Addendum.
5
Full test of 42 C.F.R. § 440.70 in Addendum.

4
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"(c) "Prosthetic devices" means replacement, corrective, or supportive
devices prescribed by a physician or other licensed practitioner of the
healing arts within the scope of his practice as defined by State law to—(1)
Artificially replace a missing portion of the body;
(2) Prevent or correct physical deformity or malfunction; or (3) Support a
weak or deformed portion of the body."
42 C.F.R. § 440.230:
"(a) The [state Medicaid] plan must specify the amount, duration, and scope
of each service that it provides for (1) The csitegorically needy; and (2) Each
covered group of medically needy.
(b) Each service must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to
reasonably achieve its purpose.
(c) The Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount,
duration, or scope of a required service under §§ 440.210 and 440.220 to an
otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness,
or condition.
(d) The agency may place appropriate limits on a service based on such
criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control procedures."
42 C.F.R. § 441.15(a)(3):
"With respect to the services defined in § 440.70 of this subchapter, a State
plan must provide that— (a) Home health services include, as a minimum--(3) Medical supplies, equipment, and appliances."6
Utah Admin. Code R414-54-4(l):
"(1) Speech-language pathology services are available only to clients who
are pregjiant women or who are individuals eligible under the Early and
Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Program."
Utah Admin. Code R414-70-2(2):
"As used in this rule:

6

Full text of 42 C.F.R. § 441.15 in Addendum.
4
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"Durable medical equipment" or "DME" means equipment that: (a) can
withstand repeated use; (b) is primarily and customarily used to serve a
medical purpose; (c) generally is not useful to a person in the absence of an
illness or injury; (d) is suitable for use in the home."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Proceedings and Disposition Below.
This is an appeal of the final agency order issued by the Executive Director
of the Agency, adopting in full the recommended decision of the ALL The ALLs
decision upheld the Agency" s denial of prior approval of the purchase of Speech
Augmentative Communication Devices (SACD) for Conley/Olguin. The prior
approval request for Medicaid funding of an SACD for Conley was denied by the
Agency in a notice dated February 22,2010. (r. 30) The rationale for the denial
was that it is not a covered benefit. The prior approval request for Medicaid
funding of an SACD for Olguin was denied by the Agency in a notice also dated
February 22,2010. (r. 44) The denial stated that the requested device is not a
covered benefit. Conley requested administrative review of the denial on February
25,2010. (r. 1) Olguin requested administrative review of the denial on February
26,2010. (r.7)
Prior to a hearing the parties presented memoranda on the principle legal
issue involved in each appeal - whether the Agency can categorically deny
funding for SACDs for adults. For the purpose of addressing this question only,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5

the two cases were combined. On May 20,2010, The Executive Director of the
Agency approved a final agency order (r. 97-98), approving—without
modification—the ALJ's recommended decision (r. 99-108). This completed the
administrative review process.
Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented
For the purposes of the motions below, and this appeal, the relevant facts are
few, and were identified in both parties' prehearing memoranda. They are as
follows:
Nicholas Conley
Nicholas Conley is a 22-year-old gentleman with spastic quadriplegia caused
by cerebral palsy, (r. 23) He lives at home with his mother who is his primary
caretaker. He has limited motor control throughout his body, and uses a power
wheelchair for mobility purposes, (r. 23-24) Nicholas understands language at the
conversational level. He attempts to initiate communication, respond to questions,
and indicate wants, needs, and desires, (r. 24) Throughout his school years,
Nicholas participated in his education by using an S ACD provided by the school
district. He used it to make his medical needs known, to ask and answer questions
in class, and to make friends. When Nicholas turned twenty-two, he aged out of
special education services. Nicholas' treating physician and speech therapist both
7
8

See Addendum for full text.
See Addendum for full text.
6
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found that an SACD was medically necessary for him to continue into adulthood
by allowing him functional communication ability across a variety of contexts, (r.
27; T. 29) Without such a device, Nicholas has no way to communicate any of his
basic wants or needs to the outside world. He has no way to carry on meaningful
conversations, or to interact with friends or family members. The medical
necessity for the requested device was never at issue.
Patty Olguin
Patty Olguin is a thirty-eight year- old woman who was diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis at the age of eight. In 2002, she suffered a cerebrovascular
accident (stroke) during a surgical operation to her leg which caused severe
dysarthria, (r. 31)9 Patty currently resides in a nursing home. Her cognitive
function and her expressive and receptive communication skills are within normal
limits, but her ability to express herself is severely limited due to her medical
condition, (r. 31—32) Patty is her own legal guardian and thus retains full control
of her medical and financial decision-making. Her treating physician and speech
therapist both found an SACD to be medically necessary, (r. 38; r. 43) Without an
SACD, Patty cannot communicate to her nursing staff when she is in pain or
having a medical complication. She cannot express her desires concerning
advanced medical directives. She cannot adequately govern her financial affairs.
9

Dysarthria is a motor speech disorder resulting from neurological injury, characterized
by poor articulation. See http ://asha. org/public/speech/disorders/dysarthria.htm.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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She is prevented from engaging in social activities in the facility, interacting with
people in the community, and from having conversations with friends or family.
The medical necessity of the requested device was never at issue.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A.

SACDs are considered durable medical equipment and prosthetic

devices. Durable medical equipment (DME) is covered under Utah's Medicaid
plan in the category of services Home Health Services. The prosthetic devices
category of services is also included in Utah's Medicaid plan. The Agency covers
DME and prosthetics for adults. However, it does not cover SACDs for adults.
B.

The Agency's policy to exclude coverage of SACDs for adults as

DME violates the Medicaid Act. Under the Act a state Medicaid agency must have
reasonable standards for the services and devices it provides that are consistent
with the objectives of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). The purpose of the
Medicaid program is to provide medical assistance to individuals and families
"whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services" and "rehabilitation and other services to help such families and
individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-care." 42 U.S.C. §
1396-1.
C.

The reasonable standards requirement of the Medicaid Act limits the

discretion a state agency has to limit or deny particular services or devices.
8
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Durable medical equipment, and thus SACDs, are mandatory services. SACDs are
a covered service in that prosthetic devices are included in Utah's Medicaid plan.
For many individuals SACDs are critical to their ability to function independently
and engage in activities most take for granted. Numerous courts have found that
an artificial distinction in coverage of SACDs between children and adults, not
based on medical need, is unreasonable. It violates 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17),
which requires that all Medicaid services must be sufficient in amount, duration,
and scope to reasonably achieve their purpose.
D.

By categorically excluding coverage of SACDs as DME for adults,

the Agency has created an exclusive list with no reasonable and meaningful
process for requesting medically necessary services that are not included on the
agency's list of covered durable medical equipment. The Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) of the federal Department of Health and Human
Services, the agency that administers the Medicaid program on the federal level,
has determined that such exclusive lists violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).
Numerous court decisions have relied on this directive by CMS to strike down
exclusive lists.
E.

The reasonable standards mandate of the Medicaid Act precludes state

agencies from categorically denying prior approval of medically necessary services
or devices that are within a category of services included in a state's Medicaid
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plan. SACDs, as durable medical equipment, fall within the category of Home
Health Services that must be included in the Agency's plan. They also fall within
the category of prosthetic devices, which is also a covered category of services
under Utah's Medicaid plan. The policy at issue categorically denies medically
necessary services within two covered category of services, and therefore violates
the reasonable standards provisions of the Medicaid Act and implementing
regulations.
F.

The policy at issue also violates the "Comparability of Services"

mandate of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) and 42 C.F.R. §§
440.230(b) and (c). That provision requires that medical services and devices be
available in comparable amount, duration and scope to different groups of
Medicaid eligible groups. By treating adults and children differently in the
coverage of SACDs, the Agency is not making SACDs available in amount,
duration and scope between the two groups, thus violating the Medicaid Act. It
also creates an arbitrary and unreasonable distinction in coverage based on age that
makes the device insufficiently available to meet its purpose, and discriminates
based on the diagnosis and condition of the adult.
ARGUMENT
To assist in the understanding of the ALJ's decision below, Nicholas Conley
and Patty Olguin reframe that decision as follows. The premise of the ALJ's
10
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decision is that a state Medicaid agency has considerable discretion in developing
and implementing its Medicaid plan. She then, in essence, rejected all of Nicholas
Conley's and Patty Olguin's statutory-based arguments, and went on to determine
that what was left was an issue of policy between the statement of purposes found
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 and specific Medicaid Act statutes, regulations, Utah state
administrative rules, and the Agency's policies. She held that these specific
provisions trump the more general statement of purpose. With that she dismissed
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's appeal.
Congress created the Medicaid program in 1965 by adding Title XIX to the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v. The purpose of Medicaid is to
enable each State,
"as far as practicable.. .to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such
families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or selfcare."
42 U.S.C. §1396.
State participation in Medicaid is optional. However, a state that chooses to
participate, and thereby receive federal matching funds for program expenditures,
"must comply with requirements imposed both by the Act itself and by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S.
34, 37 (1981); see also Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1989).
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L

THE ALJ MISCHARACTERIZED THE LEVEL OF DISCRETION A
STATE MEDICAID AGENCY HAS IN DEVELOPING AND
IMPLEMENTING ITS MEDICAID PROGRAM.
The ALJ based her decision on her conclusion that a state Medicaid agency

has substantial discretion when fashioning its Medicaid program and developing
the policies to implement it. She cites dicta in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
105 S.Ct. 712 (1985), where the Supreme Court stated that "The Act gives the
States substantial discretion to choose the proper mix of amount, scope, and
duration limitations on coverage, as long as care and services are provided in cthe
best interests of the recipients.'" Id. at 303. (Recommended Decision, p. 7) (r.
105)
It should be noted that the question before the Court in Alexander v. Choate
was not the scope of discretion a state Medicaid agency has under the Medicaid
Act, but whether a limitation of coverage for inpatient surgical days to 14 annually
violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Court was not looking at all
Medicaid Act provisions that limit the scope of a state Medicaid agency's
discretion. It was addressing whether the limitation of 14 days of inpatient surgical
days annually constituted "meaningful access to Medicaid services" for the
purposes of § 504. Id. at 302-03. The Court found that this reduction did not
violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
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This dicta from Alexander v. Choate is frequently quoted in the beginning of
the analysis of Medicaid Act requirements, but rarely is used directly to define the
boundaries of a state Medicaid agency's discretion. To the extent it is more than a
simple statement that a state Medicaid agency has some level of discretion, it
should be noted that the Court was only addressing a limitation to the amount of a
covered service. It was not addressing the more drastic policy of categorically
excluding altogether an otherwise covered service for a class of recipients.
The ALJ also cited 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) to define a state Medicaid
agency's discretion. (Recommended Decision, p. 7) (r. 105) The language of 42
C.F.R. § 440.230(d) is also a general statement of a state Medicaid agency's
discretion: "The agency may place appropriate limits on a service based on such
criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control procedures." This general
language does not help to define the parameters of a state agency's discretion.
These basic statements of discretion have been limited in subsequent cases.
Various specific parts of the Medicaid Act limit this discretion. As the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Hem v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1995):
Rather, Title XEX "confers broad discretion on the States to adopt
standards for determining the extent of medical assistance" offered in their
Medicaid programs. Id. at 444, 97 S.Ct. at 2370-71. In addition, federal
Medicaid regulations expressly permit participating states to "place
appropriate limits on a service based on such criteria as medical necessity
or on utilization control procedures." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d).

13
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Nonetheless, there are important restrictions on states in their exercise of
this discretion. Two of those restrictions are particularly relevant here.
First, Title XIX requires participating states to establish "reasonable
standards ... for determining ... the extent of medical assistance under [their
Medicaid] plan which ... are consistent with the objectives of [Title XIX]."
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). Second, state Medicaid plans "may not
arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of [such] service
[s] ... to an otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis,
type of illness, or condition." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c).
Id., at 910. See also Lankfordv. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 506 (8m Cir. 2006); Utah
Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Graham, 892 F.Supp. 1379,1383 (D. Utah 1995);
McMillan v. McCrimon, 807 F.Supp. 475,481-82 (CD. 111. 1992) (discretion
limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) - Reasonable Promptness mandate). Nicholas
Conley's and Patty Olguin's arguments are premised on these statutory limitations.
The discretion referred to by the ALJ does not impact these mandates. They must
be met.

n.

MEDICAL SERVICES AND DEVICES CAN FALL WITHIN
MULTIPLE MEDICAID AUTHORIZED CATEGORIES OF
SERVICES.
There are 29 different categories of services that can be included in a state's

Medicaid plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d. Seven of those
categories of services must be included in a state plan.' 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(A). Each of those 29 different categories of services include many
specific types of services or devices.
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A particular medical service or device can fall within more than one
category of services. Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that
abortion procedures fall within four different categories of services.) The Federal
District Court for Western Texas recognized that SACDs are both DME and
prosthetic devices. Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Sei*vices Commission, 924
F.Supp. 788, 791-92 (W.D. Tex. 1996). In William T v. Taylor, 465 F.Supp.2d
1267, 1284-1285 (N.D. Ga. 2000) the court noted that in 2000, forty-seven state
Medicaid programs covered SACDs without age restriction, and did so under
multiple service categories. Id., at 1284-85 (holding that SACDs fall under "Home
Health Services-DME" "prosthetic devices", and "speech language pathology
equipment").10 At this juncture, forty-nine states cover SACDs for adults. The
large majority of states provide them for beneficiaries under the DME category,
while a few categorize them as both DME, prosthetics, and/or speech language
pathology equipment.11 Utah's Medicaid program is the only traditional Medicaid
program that does not provide SACDs for adults.
10

As discussed by the ALJ in her decision, a state must provide SACDs to children. This
figure therefore represents the number of states that cover SACDs for adults.
11
Due to length and complexity, a list of citations regarding coverage criteria for each
state are provided in the Addendum Table of Contents, rather than included here as a
footnote. The citations reference to administrative rule where applicable. 19 states
address SACD coverage explicitly through administrative rule; 25 states incorporate by
reference their SACD coverage policies through administrative rule and Medicaid policy
manual; 5 states address SACD coverage solely through Medical policy manual without
reference to an administrative rule. The individual state citations are further separated by
state in alphabetical order.
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There is no definition of DME in the Medicaid Act or its implementing
regulations. Each state defines the term. The Agency defines the term as:
"equipment that can withstand repeated use, is primarily and customarily used to
serve a medical purpose, generally is not useful to a person in the absence of
illness or injury, and is appropriate for use in the home." Utah Admin. Code
R.414-70-2(2). SACDs meet this definition. They are made for repeated use,
designed for medical purpose — restoring the ability to communicate previously
limited by a defect in speech system, not useful to one who does not have such a
physiological impairment, and certainly would be used in the home.
Prosthetic devices are defined by federal regulation. They are
replacement, corrective, or supportive devices prescribed by a physician or
other licensed practitioner of the healing arts within the scope of his
practice as defined by State law to (1) artificially replace a missing portion
of the body; (2) prevent or correct physical deformity or malfunction; or
(3) support a weak or deformed portion of the body.
42 C.F.R. 440.120(c). SACDs are prosthetic devices. They are a corrective device
that remediates a deformity or malfunction, i.e. physiological speech mechanism.
They also support a weak or deformed physiological speech mechanism.
Durable medical equipment falls within the covered category of services
Home Health Services. 42 C.F.R. § 441.15(a)(3). Home Health Services is a
mandatory category of services that must be included in a state Medicaid plan.
12

TennCare, a Medicaid waiver program in Tennessee that serves part of Tennessee's
Medicaid population, does not currently cover SACDs for adults, see Addendum.
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"(a) A State plan must specify that, at a minimum, categorically needy recipients
are furnished the following services: (1) The services defined in §§ 440.10 through
440.50,440.70, ..." 42 C.F.R. § 440.210(a)(1). "44.70" is 42 C.F.R. § 440.70, in
which Home Health Services are defined. Thus, DME is a mandatory service for
all categorically needy Medicaid recipients.
Prosthetic devices fall within the category of services "prescribed drugs,
dentures, and prosthetic devices." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(12). It is an optional
category of services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). The Agency has included this
category of services in its state Medicaid plan.
While SACDs fall within the covered categories of services Home Health
Services as durable medical equipment, and Prescribed Drugs, Dentures, and
Prosthetic Devices, the Agency identifies them only as speech language devices
under the Speech Language category of services. In doing so it has de facto
excluded them from coverage for adults as DME or prosthetic devices.

m.

THE AGENCY'S CATGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACDS FROM COVERAGE FOR ADULTS AS DME
VIOLATES THE REASONABLE STANDARDS MANDATE OF 42
U.S.C § 1396a(a)(17).
A state Medicaid agency's policies implementing its Medicaid plan must be

reasonable and consistent with the fundamental purposes of the Medicaid Act. "A
state plan for medical assistance must... (17) include reasonable standards ... for
17
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determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan
which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this subchapter, ..." 42 U.S. C. §
1396a(a)(17) Agency's categorical denial of coverage of SACDs for adults is
unreasonable and in violation of the Medicaid Act in three respects: (1) denying a
device that meets a basic human need and promotes independence for reasons
other than medical need is fundamentally unreasonable; (2) mamtaining a list of
available DME and categorically excluding SACDs from that list for adults creates
an exclusive list without any reasonable and meaningful procedure for requesting
medically necessary items that do not appear on its pre-approved coverage list, and
is inherently unreasonable; (3) denying a medically necessary service that falls
within a covered category of services in a state's Medicaid plan is unreasonable.
The reasonable standards mandate applies to durable medical equipment.
William T. v. Taylor, 465 F.Supp.2d 1267,1282-1283 (N.D. Ga. 2000). In that
decision the court relied in part on a letter from the director of the federal agency
•I n

that oversees the Medicaid program, the Health Care Financing Administration :
As you know, the mandatory home health services benefit under the
Medicaid program includes coverage of medical supplies, equipment, and
appliances suitable for use in the home (42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3)). A state
may establish reasonable standards, consistent with the objectives of the
Medicaid statute, for determining the extent of such coverage (42 U.S.C. §
1396(a)(17)) based on such criteria as medical necessity or utilization
control (42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d)). In doing so, a State must ensure that the
13

The agency was subsequently renamed Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS).
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amount, duration, and scope of coverage are reasonably sufficient to
achieve the purpose of the service (42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b)). Furthermore, a
State may not impose arbitrary limitations on mandatory services, such as
home health services, based solely on diagnosis, type of illness, or
condition (42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c)).
Id, at 1279. See also Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496,512-513 (8th Cir. 2006);
Esteban v. Cook, 11F. Supp. 2d 1256,1260 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Bell v. Agency for
Health Care Admin., 768 So.2d 1203,1204 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000).

A.

THE AGENCY'S POLICY THAT EXCLUDES COVERAGE OF
MEDICALLY NECESSARY SACDS FOR ADULTS AS DME IS
UNREASONABLE IN THAT IT MAKES UNAVAILABLE A DEVICE
THAT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ENGAGING IN A FUNDAMENTAL
AND ESSENTIAL HUMAN PROCESS, COMMUNICATING
ORALLY, AND LIMITS THE INDIVIDUAL'S INDEPENDENCE.
A fundamental purpose of the Medicaid Act is to "furnish . . . (2)

rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals attain or
retain capability for independence or self-care." 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1. SACDs
make an individual who cannot speak more independent - they enhance the ability
to communicate needs, choices, and develop the type of normal relationships that
others without this limitation enjoy. "Language is the principal skill distinguishing
human beings from other animals. The inability to speak can be the single most
devastating aspect of any handicap. Augmentative communication devices are on
the market today which enable many people with severe speech impairments to
communicate verbally." Ellen M. Saideman, Helping the Mute to Speak: The
19
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Availability of Augmentative Communication Devices Under Medicaid, 17N.Y.U.
REV.L. & SOC.CHANGE 741, 741 (1989/1990), (quoted in Fred C. v. Texas
Health and Human Services Commission, 988 F.Supp. 1032,1034 (W.D. Tex.
1997):
Because the ability to speak and communicate is vital, augmentative
communication devices have enabled adult Medicaid recipients with severe
speech impairments to live on their own, maintain employment, pay taxes
and become productive members of the community rather than wards of
the State. This limits the cost of other medical services, such as nursing
expenses, and reduces or eliminates the costs of disability and other welfare
benefits. Helving the Mute to Speak 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE at 741. This Court cannot divine a rational basis to make
available the blessings of speech to one who is twenty years three hundred
sixty-four days old and deny the same blessing to one who is two days
older.
M , at 1036.
Nicholas Conley currently has an SACD, and will be significantly impacted
when that device no longer works. Where he once was able to make friends, he
will lose those relationships because he can no longer communicate with them.
His ability to interact with family will likewise be limited. Communicating with
members of the public, and establishing new relationships will be difficult at best.
Patty Olguin is currently in a nursing home because of various medical
needs. Without an SACD she is denied the ability to communicate when she is in
pain or having a medical complication. She cannot adequately govern her financial
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affairs. She is unable to engage in social activities in the nursing home, interact
with others in the community, or have conversations with family members.
The court in Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission, 988
F.Supp. 1032 (W.D. Tex. 1997) clearly found that a policy that denies a class of
people a device mat is fundamental to promoting their independence is inconsistent
with the basic purposes of the Medicaid Act, and thus in violation of the reasonable
standards requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). Id. at 1036. Other courts that
have reviewed policies restricting SACDs to beneficiaries less than twenty-one
years old have found them unreasonable and inconsistent with the Medicaid Act.
Meyers v. Reagan, 116 F.2d241 (8th Cir. 1985); Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914
(S.D. Fla. 1996). Courts, in reference to different Medicaid services, have likewise
held that a categorical child/adult distinction in coverage is unreasonable and
violates the Medicaid Act. See generally Radaszewski v. Garner, 346 Ill.App.3d
696, 805 N.E.2d 620 (111 Ct App 2004); Salgado v. Kirschner, 878 P.2d 659
(Ariz.1994) (en banc), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1151,115 S.Ct. 1102, (1995).
B.

THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACDS FOR ADULTS AS DME CREATES AN
EXCLUSIVE LIST FOR WHICH THERE IS NO REASONABLE
AND MEANINGFUL PROCEDURE FOR REQUESTING THE
DEVICE.
A state may not maintain a list of durable medical equipment that it will

cover, except for purposes. The failure to preclude access to durable medical
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equipment that is not included on that list violates the Reasonable Standards
mandate. In William T v. Taylor, 465 RSupp.2d 1267, 1279 (N.D. Ga. 2000), the
court relied in part upon the CMS letter mentioned previously:
An ME [medical equipment] policy that provides no reasonable and
meaningful procedure for requesting items that do not appear on a State's
pre-approved list, is inconsistent with the federal law discussed above. In
evaluating a request for an item of ME, a State may not use a "Medicaid
population as a whole" test, which requires a beneficiary to demonstrate
that, absent coverage of the item requested, the needs of "most" Medicaid
recipients will not be met. This test, in the ME context, establishes a
standard that virtually no individual item of ME can meet. Requiring a
beneficiary to meet this test as a criterion for determining whether an item
is covered, therefore, fails to provide a meaningful opportunity for seeking
modifications of or exceptions to a State's pre-approved list. Finally^ the
process for seeking modifications or exceptions must be made available to
all beneficiaries and may not be limited to sub-classes of the population
(e.g., beneficiaries under the age of 21).
Id. (emphasis added).14

On the basis of this CMS guidance, the United States

Supreme Court vacated a court of appeals decision that had allowed the
Connecticut Medicaid program to categorically exclude coverage of medically
necessary medical equipment not listed in the state's coverage list. See Slekis v.
Thomas, 525 U.S. 1098 (1999)(vacating and remanding Desario v. Tltomas, 139
F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998). Other cases have followed the CMS guidance in ruling
that exclusive lists violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). Lankfordv. Sherman, 451
F.3d 496, 513 (8th Cir. 2006); Esteban v. Cook, 11F. Supp. 2d 1256,1260-1261
14

CMS obviously takes the stance that durable medical equipment cannot be categorically
excluded from coverage based upon age.
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(S.D. Fla. 1999); Bell v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 768 So.2d 1203, 1204
(Fla. Ct. App. 2000). The Agency has a Hst of what durable medical equipment is
covered, and the limitations on that coverage. In effect, it has an exclusive list.
Since SACDs are not a covered service for adults there is no "reasonable and
meaningful procedure" for requesting prior approval for them. Such a policy
violates the reasonable standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).
C.

THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACDS, WHICH FALL WITHIN THE COVERED
CATEGORY OF SERVICES DURABLE MEDICAL
EQUIPMENT/HOME HEALTH SERVICES, VIOLATES THE
REASONABLE STANDARDS MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(17).
As discussed above, SACDs are durable medical equipment. Durable

medical equipment is apart of the Home Health Services category of services.
Home Health Services is included in Utah's Medicaid plan. The Agency
categorically excludes coverage of SACDs for adults as durable medical
equipment. It does cover many other types of DME for adults. This categorical
denial of a service that falls within a covered category of services violates the
reasonable standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Hern v. Beye, stated:
The purpose of Medicaid as stated in the Act is to enable states to provide
medical treatment to needy persons "whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical services." Id. § 1396
(emphasis added). This circuit, as well as several other courts, has
interpreted Title XIX and its accompanying regulations as imposing a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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general obligation on states to fund those mandatory coverage services that
are medically necessary."
Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 910-911 (10th Cir. 1995). Hern v. Beye has consistently
been interpreted to hold that, in general, categorically excluding medically
necessary services that fall within a covered category of services violates the
Medicaid Act. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals applied this specifically to
DME in Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006). The court stated that
"While a state has discretion to determine the optional services in its Medicaid
plan, a state's failure to provide Medicaid coverage for non-experimental,
medically-necessary services within a covered Medicaid category is both per se
unreasonable and inconsistent with the stated goals of Medicaid." Id. at 511. The
court held that maintaining and exclusive list of covered DME items, while
categorically excluding from coverage other types of DME, violates 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17) and 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (amount, duration and scope to
reasonably achieve its purpose). Id. See also Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F.Supp.2d
736, 763 (N.D. Iowa 1999); Smith v. Palmer, 24 F.Supp.2d 955, 966 (N.D. Iowa
1998); T.L. v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, 42 P.3d
63, 66 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). The Second Circuit acknowledged this sweeping
holding oiHern when rejecting this rule in general. DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d
80, 96 (2nd Cir. 1997.) However, the Tenth Circuit precedence and ruling of law
govern this case. Utah's categorical exclusion of SACDs for adults runs afoul of
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Hern v. Beye. The categorical exclusion of SACDs for adults denies otherwise
medically necessary DME that falls within a covered category of services — Home
Health Services.

IV.

THE AGENCY'S CATGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACDS FROM COVERAGE FOR ADULTS AS DME
VIOLATES THE COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES MANDATE OF
42 ILS.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS.
The Comparability of Services mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)

requires "(B) that the medical assistance made available to any individual
described in subparagraph (A) — (i) shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope
than the medical assistance made available to any other such individual, and ..."
This provision is fleshed out more fully in regulations promulgated under the
Medicaid Act:
(a) The [state Medicaid] plan must specify the amount, duration, and scope
of each service that it provides for (1) The categorically needy; and (2)
Each covered group of medically needy.
(b) Each service must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to
reasonably achieve its purpose.
(c) The Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount,
duration, or scope of a required service under §§ 440.210 and 440.220 to
an otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of
illness, or condition.
42 C.F.R. § 440.230. This regulatory provision implements the requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B). See 42 C.F.R. § 440.200(a)(1) ("amount, duration and
scope" referred to includes 42 C.F.R. §§ 400.230(a), (b) and (c)).
25
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A.

THE AGENCY'S EXCLUSION OF COVERAGE OF SACDS FOR A
GROUP OF CATEGORICALLY NEEDY INDIVIDUALS FOR
REASONS OTHER THAN MEDICAL NEED VIOLATES THE
COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(b).
Numerous cases have applied the Comparability of Services mandate where

a state's policies make clear distinctions between individuals within the same
categorically needy group based on factors other than medical need. The New
York federal district court applied 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) to distinctions
based on age, finding that the distinction violated the comparability of sendees
requirement. Hodecker v. Blum, 525 F.Supp. 867, 873 (D.C.N.Y. 1981); see also
Sobkyv. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123,1142 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (distinction based upon
location found to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)).
The Agency's policy creating a distinction in coverage between adults and
children precludes coverage for some categorically needy groups as opposed to
others based on factors other than medical need. This distinction, based on factors
other than medical need, violates that statutory mandate.
B.

THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF SACDS FOR
ADULTS VIOLATES THE AMOUNT, DURATION AND SCOPE
REQUIREMENTS OF 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.230(b) AND (c).
The Agency's policy violates the amount, duration and scope requirements

of 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.230(b) and (c) in three distinct ways: (1) the categorical denial
of coverage of SACDs specifically for reasons other than medical need renders
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those devices unavailable given the medical purpose of the device; (2) a policy
which categorically denies coverage of SACDs for adults, while covering other
types of DME, is insufficient to reasonably achieve its purpose; (3) excluding
coverage of S ACDs for adults who have impairments of their speech processes,
while providing other types of DME to people with different types of physical
impairments arbitrarily denies an otherwise covered service based upon the
diagnosis or condition of the individual. This is disallowed under the Medicaid
Act.
1.

The Categorical Exclusion of SACDs for Adults Makes Those Devices
Insufficiently Available Given the Medical Purpose of the Device.
Clearly age does not preclude an individual from using and benefitting from

an SACD. Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's treating health care professionals
determined that for them the device is medically necessary. Being twenty-two as
opposed to twenty years of age, as Nicholas Conley is, has absolutely nothing to do
with the purpose of the device, his medical need for it, or the fact that will greatly
enhance his independence. At 38 years of age Patty Olguin will still benefit
significantly from the SACD recommended for her by her treating health care
professionals, as well as many other purposes.
A state Medicaid agency must assure that each service that falls within a
covered category of services must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope
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to reasonably achieve its purpose. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b). The courts in Free?
C. v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission and Hunter v. Chiles
ruled that not only did a limitation on the coverage of SACDs to children
violate the Reasonable Standards requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), it
also violates 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b). The age-based distinction rendered the
device insufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its
purpose. Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission, 988 F.
Supp. 1032, 1036 (WD. Tex. 1997); Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914, 920
(S.D. Fla. 1996). Courts have found similar exclusions of DME for adults
violate 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b). InEsteban v. Cook, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1260-1262 (S.D. Fla. 1999) the court determined that a policy excluding the
coverage of wheelchairs costing more than $582 for adults effectively excluded
coverage of power wheelchairs. This limitation made power wheelchairs
insufficient in amount to reasonably achieve their purpose. The categorical
exclusion of SACDs here entirely excludes SACDs from meeting their purpose
for adults. The unreasonableness of the age-based distinction applies equally
to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b).
2.

The Categorical Exclusion of SACDs for Adults Makes Those
Devices Insufficiently Available When Compared to Other Types of
DME.
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The Agency's age-based distinction in the availability of SACDs when
compared to other types of DME likewise violates 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b). It
is clearly unreasonable that an adult that needs one type of DME (e.g., a
wheelchair), can receive reimbursement for that wheelchair, while the same
person who needs another type of DME, an SACD, has no access to that
device. He or she would be able to access the community, but be unable to
communicate with anyone there. The dichotomy happens more frequently
between two adults. That discrimination in the scope of DME covered for
adults has no relationship to medical need. The exclusion of SACDs for adults
as compared to other forms of DME unreasonably makes the availability of
SACDs as DME insufficient in scope to reasonably achieve their purpose.
3.

The Categorical Exclusion of SACDs for Adults With Impairments
in Their Communication Process is Discriminatory When
Compared to Individuals Who Are Eligible for Other Forms of
DME Because of a Different Physical Impairment.
The Agency's limitation on the availability of SACDs, based upon age,

as compared to other types of DME that are not limited in their coverage by
age, creates a distinction based upon the diagnosis or condition of the
individual and not upon medical need. Individuals with physical impairments
that limit their ability to communicate orally have no access to a particular type
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of medically necessary DME. An adult with a different physical impairment
who needs a different type of DME to be more functional will have access to
that medically necessary type of DME. Again, an example of this is the adult
who has a mobility impairment. He or she will have access to a wheelchair to
meet their medical need. The consequence of this difference in coverage of
different forms of DME is discriminatory based upon the condition of the
individual.
The Agency "may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or
scope of a required service under 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.210 and 440.220 to an
otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or
condition." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c). For Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin, who
are categorically needy for purposes of eligibility for Medicaid, SACDs fall under
42 C.F.R. §440.210.
More generally, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that distinctions
in coverage of a specific device or service based on something other than medical
need violates 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c). Hem v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Or.
1995). In Hern, which involved the availability of Medicaid funding for abortion,
the court concluded that "abortions to terminate pregnancies resulting from rape or
incest" constituted a "diagnosis, type of illness, or condition." Id. at 907, 910.
This is a far broader definition of those terms than what Nicholas Conley and Patty
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Olguin suggest here - a distinction in the type of physical impairment two adults
have. The categorical exclusion of SACDs for adults, when other types of DME
are covered for adults with different physical impairments, constitutes an arbitrary
limitation of a device within a covered category of services based upon the
diagnosis or condition of the individual.
V.

THE AGENCY'S CATGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACDS FROM COVERAGE OF SACDS FOR ADULTS
AS PROSTHETIC DEVICES VIOLATES THE REASONABLE
STANDARDS MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) AND THE
COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(B) AND ITS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.
Prosthetic devices are defined as:
replacement, corrective, or supportive devices prescribed by a physician or
other licensed practitioner of the healing arts within the scope of his
practice as defined by State law to (1) artificially replace a missing portion
of the body; (2) prevent or correct physical deformity or malfunction; or (3)
support a weak or deformed portion of the body.

42 C.F.R. 440.120(c). SACDs are prosthetic devices. They are a corrective device
that corrects a deformity or malfunction (i.e. physiological speech mechanism).
They support a weak or deformed physiological speech mechanism. See Fred C. v.
Texas Health and Human Semices Commission, 924 F. Supp. 7885 792 (W.D. Tex.
1996)(determining that SACDs are a prosthetic device).
The exclusion of SACDs as a prosthetic device generally, and exclusively
placing them in the speech language category of services, de facto excludes them
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from coverage as a prosthetic device for adults. The category of prescribed drugs,
dentures, and prosthetic devices is included in Utah's State Medicaid Plan.
The analysis in Arguments III and IV above applies equally to the Agency's
policy at issue here in regards to SACDs as prosthetic devices. The policy violates
the reasonable standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) in that it
categorically denies coverage for adults of a device that is essential for engaging in
a fundamental and essential human process, communicating orally, and limits the
independence of those that need an SACD to communicate. (Argument HIA.) It
also categorically denies a medically necessary service within a covered category
of services for reasons other than medical need. (Argument HIC.) The analysis of
Argument IV, that the exclusion of SACDs as DME violates the mandates of 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) and 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b), also applies here. The same
groups are impacted. The analysis does not change simply because of the category
into which the device falls. The Agency's categorical exclusion of SACDs as •
prosthetic devices for adults violates the Medicaid Act.

VI. THE ALJ ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CATEGORICAL
DENIAL OF SACDS FOR ADULTS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
REASONABLE STANDARDS M A N D A T E OF 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17) and THE COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES M A N D A T E
OF 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) AND 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) and (c).
The ALJ began her analysis by concluding that a state Medicaid agency has
wide discretion in developing and implementing its state Medicaid plan.
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(Recommended Decision, p. 7) (r. 105) This was the premise for the rest of her
analysis. The ALJ found that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) was not applicable to this
matter. She asserted that it only applies to financial eligibility for the Medicaid
program in general, not to eligibility for specific Medicaid services or devices.
(Recommended Decision, p. 6) (r. 104). She did not directly address whether the
age distinction in the coverage of SACDs violates either 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(B) or 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b). She did distinguish cases that support
Conley VOlguin's arguments under those statutory and regulatory provisions. The
ALJ dismissed Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's argument related to coverage
of SACDs as DME or prosthetic devices, stating that just because SACDs can be
covered under those categories does not mean they need to be. (Recommended
'Decision, p. 7) (r. 105) In her opinion, the Agency has the discretion to place all of
speech language pathology and associated equipment and supplies under speech
language, thereby denying coverage of SACDs to adults under that category of
services. (Recommended Decision, p. 7-8) (r. 105-06)
Once the ALJ disposed of these legal arguments she characterized the case
as one of policy. She characterized Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's
reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 as a policy argument. She implicitly stated that
this is not an enforceable statute. Invoking the statutory construction rule used in
resolving conflict between statutes, that more specific provisions prevail over more
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general ones, she determined that federal regulations, state statutes, rules and
policies cited by the Agency "trump" the more general policy statement of 42
U.S.C. § 1396-1. (Recommended Decision, p. 6,7) (r. 104-05)
The ALJ's faulty analysis of a state Medicaid agency's discretion is laid out
in Argument I above. Her interpretation of the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)
is inconsistent with the plain wording of that statute. It states "(a) A state plan for
medical assistance m u s t . . . ( 1 7 ) . . . include reasonable standards . . . for
determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance . . . " 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17) (emphasis added). The second clause clearly adds the provision of
specific services or devices to its reasonable standards requirement. All of the
cases cited above in Argument EI apply the reasonable standards mandate to the
provision of specific services. See also Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 302, 100
S.Ct. 2671, 2679 (1980); William T. v. Taylor, 465 F.Supp.2d 1267,1282-83 (N.D.
Ga. 2000).
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cited various cases in support of their
arguments under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b). The ALJ
distinguished Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1995) by stating that it only
applied to arguments made under 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (Recommended
Decision, p. 8) (r. 106). However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied in part
on 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) in finding that the limitation imposed by Colorado on
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abortion coverage violated the Medicaid Act. Id. at 910-11. She also failed to
acknowledge the broader interpretation given to Hern, that in most all
circumstances the denial of a medically necessary service that falls within a
covered category of services violates the Medicaid Act.
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cited Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human
Services Commission, 988 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Tex. 1997) and Hunter v. Chiles,
944 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Fla. 1996) in the administrative proceedings below for the
proposition that an age-based distinction in covering SACDs violates 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17.) The ALJ distinguished those cases by pointing out that Utah's
categorical age-based restrictions differ from Texas' and Florida's because Utah
reserves all speech pathology services and benefits to the Speech Language
Services category explicitly. Texas and Florida did not address SACDs
specifically anywhere in their rules. They both provided them for children as
DME or prosthetic devices. (Recommended Decision, p. 8-9) (r. 106-7)
The distinction drawn between Fred C and Hunter and this matter is one of
form over substance. The ALJ never explained how this distinction impacted
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's legal analysis. The fact that the age based
distinction is related to different categories of services does not make it any more
reasonable. According to Fred C and Hunter SACDs are critical to the
independence of individuals who need them. As stated by the court in Fred C
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"This Court cannot divine a rational basis to make available the blessings of speech
to one who is twenty years three hundred sixty-four days old and deny the same
blessing to one who is two days older." Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human
Services Commission, 988 F. Supp. 1032,1036 (W.D. Tex. 1997). The court's
inability to find any rationality to the age-based distinction would not be remedied
by SACDs being placed in a Speech Language category of services rather than the
Home Health Services or Prescribed Drugs, Dentures, and Prosthetic Devices
categories of services.
It should be noted that Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin do not cite 42
U.S.C. 1396-1 as an enforceable statute. It simply identifies the purposes of the
Medicaid Act, and helps define whether the Agency's age-based distinction is
reasonable within the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (reasonable standards)
and 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (services sufficient in amount, duration and scope to
reasonably achieve their purpose).
Clearly this is not a case of conflicting policies. The categorical exclusion
of coverage of SACDs for adults violates 42 U.S.C.§ 1396a(a)(17), 42 U.S.C.§
1396a(a)(10)(B) and 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b).
CONCLUSION
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin have been denied prior authorization of
medically necessary Speech Augmentative Communication Devices by the Agency
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because they are adults. Their opportunity to communicate orally as most of us do,
and as a consequence their ability to live independently and make their wants and
needs understand and met, has been denied to them. This denial of the ability to
engage in a fundamental human function solely because of their age is
unreasonable and inconsistent with the purposes of the Medicaid Act. The
Agency's policy makes unavailable devices within a category of services with no
reasonable and meaningful way to request coverage of a medically necessary
service. It excludes coverage of a device that falls within a covered category of
services.
The Agency's policy creating a distinction in coverage between adults and
children is discriminatory. It creates an unreasonable difference in coverage
between two groups, children and adults that is not based on medical need. It
makes SACDs unreasonably unavailable in amount, both between adults and
children, and between adults that require different forms of DME. It also makes
SACDs arbitrarily unavailable, in comparison to other forms of DME needed by
other adults with different physical impairments, based upon the diagnosis or
condition of the adult. The policy at issue violates the Medicaid Act.
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin respectfully request that this matter be
remanded to the Agency to further administrative appeal proceedings addressing
whether the devices requested for them are medically necessary.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
37 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December, 2010.

Robert B.Denton
Laura Bos well
Attorneys for Nicholas Conley and
Patty Olguin

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, first class mail, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners' Opening Brief, this 29th day of
December, 2010, to the following:
Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
MarkL. Shurtleff
Attorney General
P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
38 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

